

THE 'NEW' MIGRATION IN SOUTHERN EUROPE (Draft!)
Maritsa V. Poros

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Introduction: The Problem of Citizenship in Southern Europe

Migration is challenging the meaning of residency and citizenship in southern Europe today. Migrants are contesting the ethnic model of citizenship in Spain, Italy, and Greece through a continual process of negotiation with the state. That negotiation process is not occurring at the level of formal politics, but through “a sustained challenge to power holders in the name of a population living under the jurisdiction of those power holders by means of repeated public displays of that population’s worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment” (Tilly 2003: 247). In other words, recent migrants (from non-European countries) in Spain, Italy, and Greece are increasingly engaged in social movements in order to make existence and program claims (ibid) on the state for residency and citizenship rights. While those states have tended to define citizenship in terms of ethnic membership, they have been pressured into accommodating some of the basic needs of (non-member) migrants at different points in time. Migrants’ negotiation with the state through protest, petitions, and strikes has placed direct pressure on states. States have sometimes been forced to capitulate to migrant’s demands because of their increased dependency on migrant labor, and in order to remain peaceful. Industries that depend heavily on migrant labor, furthermore, have placed pressure on states to accommodate migrant demands, while in contrast native labor unions pressure states to protect native workers from encroaching immigrant workers. These overlapping arenas of action and actors are contributing to the contestation of citizenship in Spain, Italy, and Greece, and the ways in which social networks form and change are crucial for understanding them.

The contest over citizenship in southern Europe, however, is not one that can be located only in migrant social movements. The process of migration itself interferes with how migrant social movements can be carried out and sustained, and with what potential success certain claims can be fulfilled. The selectivity of migration flows, the social networks of migrants at the time of migration, changes in migrant networks once in the host country, and the potential for future migration either permanently out of the host country, or back and forth between the home and host countries, can affect the stability and continuity of sustained networks of actors involved in social movements and in making claims on the state. Network processes in both migration and social movements need to be considered to understand the changing meaning of citizenship and residency in southern Europe today. This paper focuses on the theoretical issues involved in migration flows, network change, and state responses to claim-making in order to explore the potential for sustained changes in the meaning of citizenship in Spain, Italy, and Greece. It does not draw (yet) from any comparative empirical investigation of migration or migrant social movements in those countries, but rather is an attempt to provide some of the groundwork for such an investigation in the future. It especially seeks to establish what bearing our understanding of migration processes has on understanding migrant social movements and contemporary challenges to prevailing models of citizenship. Whether citizenship in southern Europe will ultimately change towards a stronger ethno-national model (Brubaker 1989; 1992), a post-

national model signaling the decreasing power of the state (Soysal 1994), somewhere in between (Joppke 1999), or something else entirely remains an open question.

The 'New' Migration in Southern Europe

Spain, Italy, and Greece have been characterized, typically, as senders of immigrants to the Americas around the early 20th Century. Later on in that century (after WWII), Spanish, Italians, and Greeks migrated often as guest-workers to northern European states – Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Britain. The 1970s marked the beginning of large streams of migrants to southern Europe instead of from it. Even so, migration within Europe had been occurring for centuries in different guises and under different political circumstances, but, perhaps, had become more visible in the latter half of the 20th Century. Albanians are not a new sight in Greece, for example. Migrations of one kind or another - through trade, work, or political instability - have long been occurring in Spain, Italy and Greece. Nonetheless, only most recently have these southern European countries been named “immigrant-receiving states.” While competing stories of migration in Europe is an important topic unto itself (see Moch 1997; Hoerder 2002), this paper is concerned with how the conditions of residence and citizenship are being contested within the political boundaries of these “new” immigrant-receiving states. Spain, Italy, and Greece provide interesting cases for this question because the ethnic model of citizenship predominates in these countries, but more so because one can see a historically sequential development of the problem of citizenship beginning with Spain, then Italy, and finally Greece. (Germany might also be included as the earliest case in this sequence.)

What does the “new” migration look like? The impact of migration in southern Europe can be seen, in part, in official administrative data and in the changing legal and regulatory framework for migration flows. In Spain, a little more than 3% (1.3 million) of the population (39.9 million) is composed of immigrants as of 2002 (United Nations 2002). This and all other estimates of the immigrant populations in Spain, Italy and Greece are, of course, likely to be undercounts because of the substantial undocumented migrant populations in those countries. Top non-EU sending countries to Spain are Morocco and Ecuador with significant numbers also coming from Argentina, Peru, the Dominican Republic, China, Philippines, Senegal, India, and rapidly growing numbers from Poland and Romania. Spain passed its fourth law regulating immigration since 1985. The most recent law, which took effect in 2000, is notable for its recognition of immigration as a permanent phenomenon that involves the social integration of immigrants not simply the control of immigrant flows.

In 2002, Italy's 1.6 million foreign residents comprised almost 3% of its total population of 57.5 million (United Nations 2002). Albania, Morocco, Romania, China and the Philippines lead legal immigrant admissions to Italy. Italy has undergone its fourth regularization program in 12 years. The most recent law, the Bosso-Fini Law, includes a combination of immigrant control and liberalization regulations. It includes quotas, mandatory employer-immigrant contracts, amnesty for illegals, and family reunification provisions.

The situation in Greece is slightly different. Immigrants comprise a larger share of its small population of 10.6 million. Immigrants were about 5% (534,000) of the population in 2002 (United Nations 2002), but probably closer to 8-10% given official estimates of the undocumented immigrant population from administrative records (Cavounidis 2002).

Albanians outnumber all other immigrant groups by far, but significant numbers of immigrants come from Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, Russia, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, and older sending groups such as Egypt and the Philippines. All three countries have been in a relative state of denial in facing immigration as a permanent phenomenon that involves societal integration. However, Greece, in particular, has lagged behind Spain and Italy in devising a national immigration policy, and in moving towards integration of immigrants. Its first regularization program was implemented as recently as 1998 (Cavounidis 2002). In all three countries, the shift towards these newer policies of integration has been heavily embroiled in a heated popular discourse about social and economic relations between immigrants and citizens, and has sometimes been accompanied by social movements or sporadic protests and riots over workers' and residents' rights.

Migration to Spain, Italy, and Greece is occurring in a number of different ways that may have important consequences for these migrant social movements or for successful residency and citizenship claims to state officials. Different categories of migrants, such as guestworkers, refugees, and undocumented migrants are flowing in and out of southern Europe. These flows of migrants can be conceptualized in terms of a broader relational framework (see Emirbayer 1997) that focuses on social networks as a primary force behind their migration. Below I present that theoretical framework, and a typology for examining variation in migration flows and processes of migrant incorporation into host societies.¹ Then, I draw some implications for potential migrant involvement in making claims for residency and citizenship rights through social movements.

A Relational Framework for Migration

A relational account of migration emphasizes processes and relations that change in time and space as exemplified by network analyses and as opposed to variable-based analyses, which focus on individual-level behaviors or attributes. Shifting our attention to *how* individuals migrate rather than from where they have migrated, or other individual-level attributes migrants share in common, allows us to locate patterns and regularities in migration flows across national-origin or ethnic groups and to identify significant factors within those patterns, namely different types of social ties and relations of exchange found in migration networks. Relations of individuals, households, communities, organizations, and states, which make up migrant social ties, drive migration flows and some socioeconomic outcomes. Patterns of those ties and the negotiation of the exchange of money, resources, influence, and status within them continually change in this process.

Migration shapes networks and networks shape migration. Migration creates possibilities for new networks and it changes relations within old and new social ties. Configurations of ties cause certain types of migration, and migration streams produce and reproduce networks that affect migrant's physical, social and economic mobility. Constraints on mobility are ironically set by existing network ties, more so than (but not instead of) human capital, individual attributes, wage differentials between countries, immigration policies, socioeconomic contexts of receiving countries, racial discrimination, etc.²

¹ A more detailed explanation of this framework is available in Poros (2003).

² This claim extends prior theories of migration that emphasize networks and relations, and that can be read as implicitly or partially relational. See, for example, studies by Grieco (1987), Julca (1997), Kyle (2000), Levitt

Interpersonal, Organizational, and Composite Ties

Massey et al. (1998: 42) define migrant networks as “sets of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants in origin and destination areas through ties of kinship, friendship, and shared community of origin.” Migration through interpersonal ties to kin, friends, and community has been documented in virtually every part of the world and historical era. Interpersonal ties reduce transaction costs and the risk of migrating because interpersonal others provide aid, information, and resources (or promises of these things) necessary to migrate and secure housing and an economic livelihood (even if only temporarily) at the destination. While interpersonal ties are present and even necessary for most migrants, some migrants are embedded in networks of organizations, which affect their potential to migrate, the destination of migration, and their socio-economic incorporation differently from migrants with interpersonal ties.

Organizational ties, which are typically weak in the Granovetter sense (see Granovetter 1973), exist when individuals are embedded in the same organizations or institutions. Organizational ties are distinctive in that they refer to the mediating structure of the organization, where colleagues, co-workers, supervisors, and even friends, family, and acquaintances relate to each other. Examples of organizational ties are to others in firms, schools or universities, businesses, cultural institutes, and government or state agencies.³ Ties to people in these organizations encourage migration in various ways. Organizations actively recruit both their own members and outsiders to work, live, or study abroad. Individuals pursue overseas opportunities that become known to them through organizations. Formal aids to labor recruitment that exist within organizations, such as interviewing for overseas jobs or taking professional certification exams in immigrant sending countries, are also common.

In some cases, such as family businesses, interpersonal and organizational relations overlap in such a way that they are inseparable from each other. For example, the president of a family firm might have his sons and nephews each manage separate branches of the firm. A married couple may own and operate a business together. I refer to these as composite types of social ties. Composite ties are distinct from interpersonal and organizational ties because the relations within those ties are mediated by the organization and the family or community together as a single entity. These dense networks can produce strong obligations for members to migrate and contribute to the economic interests of the network in rigidly prescribed ways.

Interpersonal, organizational, and composite ties regulate network relations differently, and produce different patterns of migration flows and incorporation. Distinguishing between these ties also gives meaning to networks, and asks us to look at what kinds of relationships

(2001), Massey et al. (1987), Portes (1995), and Werbner (1989). It also challenges those theories by providing an account and a method for how individual attributes and historical context are part of the process of shaping network ties that encourage migration, rather than additive variables that account for historical particularities of specific cases.

³ This is a broader conception than that presented in Goss and Lindquist (1995), who show that migrant institutions (those organizations created and directed by co-ethnic migrants) are instrumental in encouraging the migration process.

make up social ties and what kinds of transactions pass through those ties that allow for migration and subsequent integration into a new society.

Types of Migration Streams

Roughly four ideal types of migration streams (defined below) can be distinguished according to their different configurations of ties: solitaries, chains, recruits, and trusties (see Table 1). These types of flows are not mutually exclusive. For example, as network ties change, flows of recruits and trusties can become chains. Some chains can also become trusties. These ideal types, then, can work together, as they can be represented simultaneously in different configurations within households or larger networks, or in sequence when networks change from one type to another. Although these four types are admittedly crude categories, we can see regularities within each type in terms of migrant selectivity (who migrates), and for socioeconomic outcomes in the host society, especially employment opportunities.

1. *Solitaries* have no prior ties. A lack of ties leads to little or no migration because international migration is costly and risky. Narratives of individuals migrating without the help of interpersonal, organizational, or composite ties in the home or host countries are rare. Accounts of solitaries are typically narrated through oral histories, written and oral biographies, and other materials that are difficult to corroborate with additional sources of evidence. For instance, Banks (1994) reports that the first two Oswal Jains migrated to Kenya in 1899 after the onset of a devastating drought and famine in their region of Gujarat, India. These two Oswals were probably solitary migrants. They may have, therefore, provided ties to Kenya as the famine became severe for many agricultural families and as they began to migrate out of the Jamnagar region. Since we often lack reliable evidence on solitaries, it is difficult to know with certainty how rare they are relative to the other types described below. Theoretically, however, they should exist.

2. *Chains*⁴ have interpersonal ties. Chains represent the most common form of migration. Chains are formed through interpersonal ties that control the process of migrant selection according to personal relations and social obligations to kin and community, not according to the formal requirements of organizations. Thus, chains typically migrate with the help of family, friends, and co-ethnics, who already reside in the host country. Many of these individuals migrate on a family visa, under immigration provisions for the spouses and children of permanent residents, the most numerous and common visa category in many countries. Some chains also migrate illegally or with temporary visas, such as tourist visas, with the expectation of informal sponsorship by kin, friends, and community members, who promise aid with jobs, housing, and social support. Examples of migrations to the US that are generally dominated by formal and informal chains are Azuayan Ecuadorans (Kyle 2000), Peruvians (Julca 1997), Mexicans, some Cubans (Massey et al. 1987; Portes and Bach 1985), and Salvadorans (Mahler 1995). In Europe, (as guestworker systems become chains of family reunification) Turkish migration to Germany and the Netherlands (Musterd and

⁴ I am grateful to Charles Tilly for allowing me to adopt the term “chain” to describe this particular form of migration that he described in his 1967 typology of migration (see Tilly and Brown 1967).

Ostendorf 1996; Soysal 1994; van Amersfoort 1995), Albanians to Italy and Greece,⁵ and Sylheti Bangladeshis to Britain (Ballard 2001) are dominated by these formal and informal chain mechanisms.⁶

3. *Recruits* have organizational ties. Those ties generally lead to the migration of professionals, students and recruited low-skill labor. However, recruited professionals depend more heavily on organizational ties than do most other recruits. Organizational ties play a critical role in controlling the process of selectivity for recruits, especially for professionals. The migration of recruited professionals is dependent on organizational requirements, such as educational degrees, certification, and licensing (see also Waldinger 1999). The help of friends or family is secondary to these requirements for migration except where those friends or family can broker the organizational ties between destinations.

Students often follow a similar path as recruited professionals by using organizational ties to faculty and classmates in their universities to pursue advanced degrees or to seek employment after finishing their degrees. Although students enter most countries as temporary migrants, i.e. they are expected to return to their home countries after completing their degree, many stay in the host country by changing their visa status or by overstaying their student visas (see U.S. Department of Education 1997). Changing visa status has been a recent trend in Germany as about 21% of foreign students in German universities were granted green cards as Information Technology specialists in 2000.⁷

Flows of recruited low-skill labor (such as guestworker systems), which initially resemble recruited professionals, quickly begin to resemble chains since human capital requirements for their recruitment are low. Once employers recruit some low-skill labor from a foreign country, they can lower their transaction costs by relying on those migrants to then informally recruit family, friends and community members to live and work with them. The global trade of Filipina domestic workers is one example of recruits, which has been prevalent in southern Europe, the Middle East, and North America. Hondagneu-Sotelo's (2001) study of the formal recruitment of domestic workers by employment agencies, and of informal recruitment mechanisms by the migrant workers themselves is an example from the U.S. Recruited low-skill labor from Morocco, Romania, Poland, and Albania in the agricultural and construction industries is prevalent in Spain, Italy, and Greece.

Asylees/refugees and smuggled migrants also roughly belong in this category. Although they are not recruited in the same sense as labor, they do migrate through networks of organizational ties (governmental and non-governmental agencies) that are often set up to

⁵ Albanian migration to Greece has not been systematically studied although some research is underway at the University of Sussex. There is, however, anecdotal evidence, media reportage, and even a few interviews by the author, which suggest that this unruly guestworker flow of recruits has become a chain flow.

⁶ Most migration studies focus on the migration of one ethnic group or sending region to one destination. This tendency results in a migration discourse that is often based on national/regional or ethnic origins. I have argued against this tendency (see Poros 2003); however, I use these examples from the migration scholarship to point to existing studies that document chain migration streams in a way that exemplifies the relational approach.

⁷ These data come from personal communication in December 2000 with the Central Placement Office of the Federal Employment Service, Press Office, Bonn, Germany (Zentralstelle für Arbeitsvermittlung der Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (ZAV), Pressestelle).

aid their flight from their home countries and re-settlement into new host societies. Many refugees and smuggled migrants have interpersonal ties that also aid their migration, but those interpersonal ties will not suffice in the case of recruits. Organizational ties are necessary for their migration. For instance, in some cases of human smuggling across borders, friends or family in the destination country will send money to a broker, who pays the coyote that will guide potential migrants across borders. Because some migrants know that they cannot obtain a legal visa or claim asylum successfully, they are at the mercy of smuggling organizations composed of coyotes and usurious middlemen until they reach their destination. Crisp (1999) notes that refugees often migrate to countries where they have interpersonal ties to help them settle and to pay for their journey. At their destination these migrants are aided by kin or friends - often those same individuals who lent them money for their perilous journey. Southern Europe is often a transit point for asylum seekers trying to migrate to northern European countries or to North America where asylum provisions are greater and where asylum seekers have interpersonal ties. See Kyle and Koslowski (2001) for an analysis of different organizational networks that operate such global human smuggling rings.

4. *Trusties* have composite (interpersonal overlapping with organizational) ties, as in dense, multiplex networks (see Portes 1995). Composite ties lead to entrepreneurial migration. The lack of external mechanisms for monitoring and enforcement in these networks (such as that which exists for recruits) makes economic activities riskier for trustees. For instance, in high-stakes activities such as the transnational diamond trade, the selectivity of migrants and the monitoring of their behavior occur within dense networks of composite ties, which control the recruitment of labor through social obligations between network members, not according to human capital characteristics (Poros 2001). Many Chinese networks of transnational traders and businessmen resemble trustees and represent a form of “flexible citizenship” through their transnational movements and positive economic relations with states caught in their trade routes (see Ong 1997). Also see Kyle (2000) on the composite ties of Otavalan Ecuadorans, who can be seen in cities such as London, New York, Amsterdam, Milan, and Barcelona playing their native Andean music. Their ties as entrepreneurial musicians, who are also friends and, sometimes, family members from the region of Otavalo, overlap producing dense networks that control who migrates as part of their entrepreneurial endeavor. In general, this type of entrepreneurial migration is relatively rare in southern Europe today.

Chains and recruits are the most common migration flows found in southern Europe. Chains and recruits interact and vary internally. Recruits formed many of the first trickles of (legal and temporary) migration into southern Europe to serve the tourism, agriculture, construction, and domestic service industries after the 1970s. Most recently, bilateral agreements have been signed between southern European countries and their immigrant-sending states to allow and regulate these formal recruitment mechanisms. However, formal, direct recruitment can slow down or even stop altogether as migrant workers in these industries informally recruit their co-ethnic friends and family members to work and live with them apart from formal agreements with employers. In this way, recruits become chains. Recruits and chains from recruits tend to have more stable grounds for integration into their host societies because they have legal documentation and/or have been able to secure their economic livelihood immediately upon entry into the host country. This situation can, of course, change overnight because of unscrupulous employers and states, but

the organizational and interpersonal ties of these migrants provide greater security for their livelihood than for chains, especially undocumented chain migrants.

Chain migration can take at least two forms, formal, direct sponsorship from kin for legal documents permitting entry, or informal sponsorship (that is, promises of housing, jobs, and social support) of kin, friends, and community members often resulting in illegal entry. In these networks of interpersonal ties, the negotiation of resources enables and constrains social and economic opportunities. While direct sponsorship for legal entry substantially enables migrants to move more freely within host countries and to be eligible for a greater set of economic opportunities, informal promises of housing, jobs, and social support are constantly negotiated and may go awry. Chain migrants are beholden to social obligations within their interpersonal ties to compensate for such risks. In states such as Spain, Italy, and Greece, where even the status of legal migrants is tenuous because of their challenge to the meaning of citizenship and unreliable enforcement of migrants' rights, these interpersonal ties become ever more crucial and fragile.

In this section, I've tried to illustrate what types of social ties produce differences in migration streams and some of the consequences for migrant incorporation upon entry into host countries. Social networks change, however. How and in what ways they change is also important for social and economic incorporation, and has implications for social movements and successful residency and citizenship claims.

Social Network Change, Migrant Claim-making, and the Boundaries of Integration

Recruits and chains tend to maintain their social networks at the origin of flows. The integration of migrants socially and economically is double-edged because interpersonal ties are so instrumental in channeling migrants into certain industries, jobs, and neighborhoods. In other words, interpersonal ties, on the one hand, lower risk and generate economic opportunities for co-ethnics (see Tilly 1998; Waldinger 1996). On the other hand, they segregate migrants from native organizations and interpersonal ties, which tends to slow integration. Native trade labor unions, immigrant associations, and social movement organizations represent several types of organizations where new organizational ties in the host country can be forged and provide new opportunities unavailable to migrant networks upon initial entry into a host country. While it might seem rational to think that acceptance into native organizations would produce better opportunities for integration, in Spain, just the opposite occurred a few years ago.

In the early 1990s, Moroccan labor migrants joined with native labor unions and Catholic institutions to seek representation for their claims to better wages and work and housing conditions. However, those organizations failed to make claims to the state on behalf of the immigrants. By the late 1990s, Moroccans began using their co-ethnic interpersonal ties to form the Moroccan Immigrant Worker's Association in order to provide a platform for their existence and program claims. Other immigrant organizations, such as *Portes Obertes*, were founded by South American domestic workers within the native organization, *Confederación General del Trabajo*. This sort of collaboration mostly with other immigrant organizations created a basis for organized protests and strikes. In 2001, immigrants occupied ten churches in Barcelona for seven weeks as they began a hunger strike in their demand for work permits for all undocumented immigrants in Spain. The church

occupation followed in other towns throughout Spain, and more people expressed sympathy with the protesters through demonstrations, sit-ins, and petitions. Some of their signs read, "For the government we are invisible." By the end of the seven weeks, every last hunger striker had received a work permit in addition to the broader written guarantees for all undocumented migrants. However, this gain only applied in Catalunya province. The aides and brokers of the Barcelona agreement were recently formed immigrant associations, Papers per Tothom (Papers for All), and the anarcho-syndicalist union, Confederación General del Trabajo. Little over a year before this small victory for Spain's immigrants, El Ejido, a town in southern Spain experienced violent riots against its immigrants. Common chants included, "Out with the Moors." The riots were apparently in response to a new immigration law passed in that year (2000) in which 70,000 illegal immigrants would become eligible for residence permits and which would allow sponsorship of family members to immigrate. Most of these illegal migrants in southern Spain provide cheap labor for the 10,000 agricultural hothouses that produce winter fruits and vegetables for export to northern Europe. Lack of adequate housing has also led to slum-like conditions for most of these immigrants.

This example of successful claim-making among immigrants in Spain is telling in several ways. First, identity enters significantly into the social networks that provide the basis for organizing. Not only do immigrant organizations form on the basis of co-national or co-ethnic ties, but broader social boundaries, in this case immigrant and non-immigrant, are also utilized for common interests. Second, and perhaps ironically, co-ethnic, interpersonal and organizational networks became necessary for broader societal integration. Early acceptance into native organizations did not lead to political representation and better opportunities for the integration of Moroccans, Ecuadorans and other immigrants. Creating new organizational ties based on co-ethnic identity and common economic and social interests became the necessary means for demanding rights of residency and well-being.

Immigrant concentration in residential enclaves and economic niches is both helpful and risky. Although fears of deportation have grown in Spain because of random identity checks, undocumented migrants cannot be deported on that basis alone. Schizophrenic regulation of migration by the state is typical of Italy and Greece also. In Italy, Umberto Bossi, leader of the populist Northern League Party - part of the governing coalition in Italy, has been stirring anti-immigrant sentiment for some time by suggesting that violent force should be used against illegal immigrants on Italy's shorelines. In the meantime, Berlusconi seems moderate in his remarks that "the Italian economy needs a certain number of immigrants [about 19,000 for northern Italy in his estimation] because there are jobs that Italians won't do" (Spillmann 2003). A 2002 law stipulates that illegal immigrants caught on Italian soil will be deported and/or jailed, while, at the same time, 700,000 immigrants without official documents have applied to obtain residency under a recent amnesty program.

Uneven control of migration is particularly noticeable in the agricultural and tourist sectors of the economy where immigrants are concentrated and work is seasonal. Although anti-immigrant sentiment in Greece is notably high in the media and popular discourse, violent riots against immigrants and immigrants' own claims on the state (for permanent residency status or amnesties) seem to be more rare than in Spain and Italy. The role of immigrants in Greece's vast informal economy in the tourist sector is shaping the politics of immigration

there and provides a research site for examining how networks and collective organizing might be disrupted or prevented from occurring altogether as they do in Spain.

An anecdotal illustration comes from Petra, a coastal village on the island of Lesbos. Once a center for olive oil trade and production around Asia Minor, its present economy is dominated by the tourist industry. Since the 1980s it has become a beachtown with umbrellas, tourbuses, hotels, and restaurants. During the six-month tourist season from May to October, Albanians, Bulgarians, Romanians and other immigrants descend on the island to work as cleaners, cooks, handymen, fruit and vegetable pickers, and in whatever other dirty, unskilled jobs are available. Most work two or three jobs, sometimes splitting their responsibilities among friends when they have scheduling conflicts. In this little village, hundreds of migrant workers (chains - both legal and illegal) work the entire season for low wages and no security. This is not uncommon, of course. However, the situation is notable in that at the end of the tourist season, when there is no more money to be made by the hotel and restaurant owners, the Greek police will summarily round up all of the undocumented immigrants and place them in detention in order to eventually send them back across the Greek-Albanian border. In this sector of the economy and perhaps only in particular places, there is a tacit agreement among the state authorities, native business owners, and sometime the immigrants themselves as to how their legal status will be managed. The probable effect on migrant networks and network change is considerable. Back and forth movement between "home" and "host" countries disrupts the possibility for significant network change (creating new organizational and interpersonal ties) and for sustained collective organizing for residency and citizenship rights. Perhaps ironically, those migrants who are most affected by uneven state regulation and schizophrenic migration policies and in whose interest it would be to organize around a set of demands for residency, well-being and citizenship rights are in the weakest position to do so. Organizers of social movements who need the sustained presence of undocumented migrants to press claims on their behalf also face a weakened position vis a vis the state.

Conclusions

Migrant social movements represent at least one important focal point for examining the negotiation of citizenship in southern Europe. The network dynamics of social movement organizers and participants require investigation, but are not sufficient to understand how movements are challenging the ethnic model of citizenship in southern Europe. The migration process, migrant networks at entry, and back and forth movements into and out of host countries, also play an important role in setting the conditions for social movement participation. The potential and ways in which networks change with settlement in the host countries, for instance, whether new networks ties can be formed and remain stable over time, will also affect whether migrant social movements can be sustained. Uneven state control of migration further seems to affect the ability of immigrants to make sustained demands on the state. In short, there are many constraints, which affect the ability of migrants to negotiate citizenship with host states. However, this phenomenon is also very recent and can be examined in its nascent stages across Spain, Italy, and Greece to uncover how residency and citizenship is being negotiated and shaped for both natives and migrants of those countries.

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Table 1. Typology of Migration Flows

Migration Flow	Social Tie Type	Examples
Solitaries	None	Rare. (e.g. first two Oswal Jains migrated to Kenya in 1899.)
Chains	Interpersonal e.g. kin, friends, community	Formal sponsorship by kin via family visas. Informal sponsorship of kin, friends, community members through promised help with jobs, housing, social support.
Recruits	Organizational ties to individuals in firms; schools or universities; cultural institutes; government agencies; employment agencies; non-governmental organizations; refugee organizations.	TNC employee transfers; labor recruitment (e.g. soft- ware engineers; teachers; low- skill work; guestworkers; domestic workers); students; asylees/refugees.
Trusties	Composite Interpersonal and organizational ties overlap. e.g. family firms/ businesses.	Transnational traders (e.g. diamond trade, garment industry; import/export trades.)